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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BRUNO DfASTON, : 
Plaintiff- : Case No. 89-0050 CA 
Respondent, 
vs. 
: Category 14-B 
DOROTHY D1ASTON, et al., 
Defendant-
Appellant. : 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal as of right from a final Decree of 
Divorce entered in a marriage dissolution action. This Court 
has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h) 
(Supp. 1988). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Was there substantial evidence to support the trial 
courtfs finding that the parties did not intend the 1973 
property settlement agreement to be binding as between 
themselves? 
2. If the trial court did err in its legal conclusion 
that the 1973 property agreement was not binding, was the error 
harmless where the property division awarded by the court was 
fair and equitable under all the circumstances? 
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying 
alimony to the wife, where the husband had no income other than 
social security and no appreciable assets, whereas the wife had 
extensive assets and was awarded sufficient assets to support 
her? 
4. Did the trial court abuse its discretion or demon-
strate bias by denying defendant's motion to reopen but stating 
in effect that it would grant the motion if plaintiff withdrew 
his objection, where plaintiff had stated he would withdraw his 
objection if defendant and the additional witnesses would submit 
to a polygraph examination? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES OR RULES 
Plaintiff is not aware of any constitutional provisions, 
statutes, ordinances, rules, or regulations whose interpretation 
is determinative to the issues raised in this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. This is an action for divorce in 
which the issues of property division and alimony were con-
tested. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. Plain-
tiff (husband, hereinafter "Bruno") filed his Complaint for 
divorce against defendant (wife, hereinafter "Dorothy") on May 
2, 1986. The Complaint also included claims against the two 
children of the parties seeking to restrain them from disposing 
of marital assets which were allegedly in their possession or 
under their control. (R. 1-5.) Dorothy answered and filed a 
Counterclaim for divorce, and also sought an award of alimony. 
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(R. 29-33,) A*t the request of Bruno, the court entered an Order 
on January 21, 1988, ordering Dorothy to pay Bruno the sum of 
$2,500.00 per month during the pendency of the action. (R. 244-
45.) 
The case came on for trial on April 18-21, 1988. (R. 307-
32.) At the conclusion of the trial, the court ordered the 
parties to submit written closing arguments. (R. 332.) On May 
9, 1988, the parties each filed their proposed Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law (R. 352, 342-51, 370-76), and written 
closing arguments (R. 360-69, 377-82). Bruno responded to the 
defendant's closing argument. (R. 383-86.) The parties 
thereafter requested that the court rule on the matter. (R. 
388-89, 390-91.) 
After the submission of the closing arguments and request 
for ruling, Dorothy filed a motion to reopen the trial to 
present additional evidence on credibility issues. (R. 392-93.) 
Bruno filed a memorandum objecting to the merits of the motion 
to reopen (R. 412-416), but also stated that he would stipulate 
to the granting of the motion if all parties and the proposed 
additional witnesses would submit to polygraph examinations. 
(R. 410-11.) The court denied the motion to reopen on the 
merits, but indicated that it would grant the motion if Dorothy 
would consent to the polygraph examinations as requested by 
Bruno. (R. 435.) Dorothy did not consent. 
On November 17, 1988, the court filed its Memorandum 
Decision. (R. 440-53.) The formal Findings of Fact and Con-
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elusions of Law (R. 454-66) , and a Decree of Divorce (R. 467-
538) were entered on December 15, 1988. 
Dorothy served a Motion to Amend Judgment or Grant a New 
Trial, on December 22, 1988. (R. 541-42.) The court denied the 
motion by ruling entered on January 10, 1989. (R. 556.) A 
formal Order Denying Defendant Dorothy D1Aston!s Rule 59 Motion 
was entered on January 12, 1989. (R. 562-63.) Dorothy filed 
her Notice of Appeal on January 23, 1989. (R. 579-80.) 
C Statement of Facts. This is a divorce action filed by 
the plaintiff Bruno DfAston ("Bruno") seeking a divorce from the 
defendant Dorothy D1Aston ("Dorothy"), requesting an equal 
division of all of the property acquired by the parties during 
the marriage and a demand that the defendant Dorothy and the co-
defendants Lisa Aston and Eric Aston ("Eric") be ordered to 
immediately return to Bruno all of his inventory of coins, 
stamps, gold and silver bullion and other valuable items which 
had been taken by him in April of 1986. (R. 1-5.) 
Dorothy and Bruno had been married and had remained 
continuously as husband and wife since September 22, 1953. 
Bruno had owned separate property prior to his marriage 
consisting generally of a coin and stamp collection and other 
valuable items, all of which are set forth in Exhibit 8. A copy 
of Exhibit 8 is made a part of the Decree of Divorce and is 
attached thereto. Bruno placed a present value on that collec-
tion of $567,700.00. (R. 686, 1. 16 through R. 687, 1. 22.) 
Dorothy testified Bruno owned assets at the time of their 
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marriage consisting of $5,000.00 and a 1952 Oldsmobile. (R. 
1402, 1. 18.) 
Bruno had acquired his separate property prior to the 
marriage by reason of his earning capacity, except the stamp 
collection which he had acquired from his father. Prior to the 
marriage, Bruno had done engineering, some tool making and mold 
making. He was also a vice president of Paper Mate Pen Company 
and was living in Puerto Rico. (R. 685, 1. 16 through R. 686, 
1. 15.) 
During the course of the marriage, as a result of Bruno's 
work effort, the parties acquired substantial property. The 
property in general consisted of business real property located 
in California, a residence located in California, together with 
personal property. During the course of the marriage, the 
business property in California was liquidated, and in March, 
1982, the residence property in California was sold for 
$1,250,000.00. There were net proceeds received from the sale 
of the house of cash in the sum of $145,920.45, a promissory 
note secured by a deed of trust on the property in the sum of 
$687,788.42, and a third deed of trust on the property in the 
sum of $300,000.00. (Exhibit 133.) 
On September 9, 1983, the $300,000.00 note was paid, and 
the proceeds of the note were used to purchase 250 twenty-dollar 
St. Goddins gold pieces for the sum of $182,250.00, jewelry in 
the sum of $2,606.00, and cash received in the sum of 
$124,198.73. This transaction is clearly set out in Exhibit 17. 
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A lot in California was sold on October 3, 1984, for 
$106,944.90. From those proceeds were purchased 100 Coronas and 
50 Pesos, fine gold, for a purchase price of $106,944.90. This 
transaction is set forth on Exhibit 18. 
In March, 1980, the parties purchased a home in Provo, 
Utah, on which substantial improvements were made. The home 
transactions and improvements are set forth on Exhibit 9. 
As of the first part of April, and prior to the events that 
incurred on or about the time Bruno was removed from the home 
premises in Provo, Utah, the parties owned property, a summary 
of which is set forth on plaintiff's Exhibit 20. 
Bruno testified that Dorothy took possession of the St. 
Goddins gold and the cash from the proceeds of the $300,000.00 
check in New Mexico where the gold pieces were purchased. (R. 
51.) Dorothy testified that Bruno had the St. Goddins gold 
pieces. Bruno testified that Dorothy took into her possession 
the $106,000.00 worth of Mexican gold. (R. 53, 1. 7.) Dorothy 
testified that Bruno took the Mexican gold. In the latter part 
of April, 1986, Bruno had gone to coin shows in San Francisco 
and in Bellevue, Washington. In San Francisco, Bruno had with 
him certain coins he had on consignment, as well as coins of his 
own. These coins he kept in three cases, one black case was 
behind the back seat in his vehicle, and two brown cases were in 
the hatch-back trunk. All three cases were chained and locked. 
When Bruno arrived home in Provo, Utah, on April 30, 1986, 
and after he had driven into his enclosed yard and gone into his 
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liouse, his three cases of coins were removed from his vehicle by 
I [,,a f'hains and locks hPinq cut' Rrnnn testified that his son 
IL!i in i limn i n llll i i In nil i i in I L e p o i ' L e i J I I Il iunit oil III j I . I n I h e III nil I In 
whole thinq ami Uhnl they had taken III co ins because MIM, 
rtidnM1 t n r . t In.m tinYmnn1. (R "'""f, mi , n i l , in l i iint.h E r i c and 
DoroLIty denied the1* tuuiw the cuiius ui UidL thuy have them. 
There was o t h e r p r o p e r t y tha t bun! In'en removed from Bruno ' s 
i i in i ill mi In i in p nil in i In I I M S p a r k e d ! ill I II in I1 in I in mi 11 III' h i I ' p n c p i l i in mi in i II II In 
tdonn home pr ior In Mm f. IIIHJI when he returned lo Prowo un Api ill 
in, l^flii Bruno t e s t i f i e d t lie p rope r ty had been removed I 
i i I h i i l>, i in in H ro l l l i y annul I l i n y Inn II ml i n I I I II II p o s s e s s 11 in .. 
Hot Ii E r i c and Dorothy denied having any of the propi i I
 ( t h a t was 
in I In-* motor home mil denied they I i. 11 I in, nul Mm consigned 
I ui 111 II i I ,! Il In I ill I II II i mi I Hi I II in i Le .J 1 I I H I II In i Hull in M II nil in II i ih i i III 
mi i" removed f i i nil lliiiii i it rim! molui Illume a r e s e t fo r th in 
I I I mi I i I t«'". <} 2 and ? 1 iiiiinl t ho consigned p r o p e r t y t h a t was rrnn 1 
Jiron the car and iiotoi liMiiiiin i LCL I MI MI on Exhibit . II. Both 
I'1 i n 1 and H iiitliy deny they had or Innn anii ul I In? 11 PUIS s e t 
f o r t II in mi i r (til i h i t - , 1 M I I Il I i II in II i i n i l 1 i in i un | i in ml 
i Ii mi iii* and cut lucks was introduced into evidence as Exhibit fj'j, 
A report was made to the Provn Police concerning the taking 
ii« I i mi i I i u i mi I- i n i ! a Ji innrnrll i in I linn1 [mo III, iLcm n y i rn II nil1"-,, 
set forth in Exhibit ,1,6 1 and testified to by Officer John Scott 
(R. 1213 I Officer Jacqueline Phil lip1 i lb I ' Ii i I in, 
H n i . l s i H I II I I  ! I ' | il'i ill Ii I i i it In | a n d I i 11 h ) i i e i j a l l I i d . i n i I , I Ii ill 
I In had III I In Il inline of the l o c a t i o n of t h e co ins I iiiiip; MI 
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documents that Bruno claimed were missing. (Exhibits 162 and 
163.) 
Bruno has been out of his home since April 30, 1986, and 
has been living in the motor home. He has been forced to go on 
social security, from which source he receives $438.00 per 
month. (R. 758, 1. 11-19.) 
At a hearing held before the trial court wherein Bruno was 
seeking a temporary alimony allowance, Bruno testified that 
Dorothy was receiving $6,300.00 per month interest payment on 
the note from the sale of the California house. (R. 609, 1. 4-
15.) Dorothy testified and said nothing concerning the payments 
being received from the note, and as a result of the hearing, 
the Court ordered Dorothy to pay Bruno $2,500.00 per month out 
of the $6,304.73 that she received each month on a temporary 
basis. (R. 658.) In fact, prior to January, 1988, Dorothy had 
apparently discounted the note approximately $54,000.00 and had 
received cash in the sum of $633,000.00. (R. 1500, 1. 6-25, 
Exhibit 144.) She was at all times under an order not to 
dispose of any property. (R. 54-56.) 
At the trial, Dorothy testified that she had on hand from 
the $633,000.00, $300,000.00 cash in a safety deposit box in Far 
West Bank (R. 1501, 1. 1-11.); she had $34,000.00 in savings (R. 
1501, 1. 15, 16) in Far West Bank (R. 1502, 1. 2); she had 
$26,000.00 in checking at Far West Bank (R. 1502, 1. 8, 9); she 
had $75,000.00 cash in a safe at home (R. 1503, 1. 2-10); she 
had purchased $86,700.00 in diamonds (R. 1503, 1. 20, 21); she 
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P" irchased $7, 600. 00 Ii i sll ver bul U on (R, 1504 1 2 , 3) ; and 
she c1a imed to have i ised over $ ] 00# 0 00.0 0 f r om September, 198 5 , 
I • i! j: • I i II Ill S 88 (I 1 5 :: It 1 22 25) 
In March of 1973, Bruno and Dorothy executed a document 
eritiMlPi'l Agreement (Exhibit 211 Biiuio testified the document 
linn1,, suggested lij hi,1, at. torney who was also vice president 11II 
Bruno's corporation, Bruno testified they were threatened -i i I In 
II I*I 11 II vwsiii I I i -mi l Ii mi n t f n r r i fM , s i i q q e s t p II II In I M i e , 1 I 1 d 1111 r m l 
I in mi i il.hy) put- t h e [did ui ^ b u i l d i n g and t h e S k y l i n e p r o p e i iy i UIHJ 
v a l u a b l e home) i n D o r o t h y ' s name so I hi rrecl i tor . i in ill I  h a \ n a 
i l II f- f 1 1 i i II I II II i i i I ! II in I i II II in II II l l l i i i 1 ( ii . i i ( i l l ) II i II in I I 1 1 i i i i i i II 
I I 10-2(1 in ll'iuiio t e s t i f i e d t h e r e win .i d i s c u s s i o n hi' I wi- MII 
I in i I 111 I i y and him, and IIP t o l l I I'IIPF what t h e y we re doimj I Ii ml Huny 
I m l I  In • p i i i p p r t | mi i i In mi in iin mi IIII i i s n < i nnr I hi i IIIU| h r i p p n i i n d iimijilli I In 
l a w s u i t t h a t was t h r e a t ened , and t h a t h n n i t h y a g r e e d t o i t , i lh 
II 6 - 2 1
 t II fl 3 '•!! 1 1 11 • ' II I 111 n o t p s t i f i e d f 1i a I' i If f P r 
t h e n II r j i i i in I 111 I hi I II MUM i l l II I  II n" i i \ hi , III i i, hi MM je i mi II in 11 I III i in y 
MI IIII1 hand led , I I mat Doro th , Hi iillledl the money mini made t h e 
d e p o s i t s ill1 "7SS I >/»-2S I-1 <M I | » | Doro thy t e s -
t i f i e d bruno d i d nu t i t ' l l IK i aiiytJiiinj allMHil p e n d i n g l a w b u i t s o r 
III in I !. s o f l a w s u i t s . ( R . 1 4 1 3 , I III" . Mi Ri m i n i t e s t i f i e d 
t h a t D o r o t h y h a 11 1 I i I  I ln> iiiiiiiiiinii , iiiiiill iiii Il ml III ' h o r V 1 i lif 
had a l w a y s done both b e l o i u rind a t lei . t h e UtJ document , IIIIIHJ 
t h a t - c o n t i n u e d t h e same way t r o n (Mr 11/ rn'iji s up u n t i l A p u l 
HI II 1 Il IIII'" ' l > 1 I >i ) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court's Finding No. 6, which found that the 
parties did not intend the 1973 property settlement agreement to 
be binding between them, was supported by substantial evidence. 
Bruno testified that he had the agreement prepared because of 
existing or potential litigation, that he communicated the 
reasons for the agreement to his wife, and that she signed it 
based upon his communications. Even if the agreement were 
valid, Dorothy has failed to show that the court's ruling was 
not harmless. The court has power to make an equitable division 
of the separate property of each party. The division of 
property made by the trial court in this case was fair and 
equitable, even if the property settlement agreement was valid. 
The trial court's denial of alimony to Dorothy was amply 
supported by the record. Bruno had no income other than social 
security. The trial court's property division left each party 
with substantial cash and assets which would amply provide for 
the support of each party. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Dorothy's motion to reopen, nor in making the grant of that 
motion contingent on Dorothy submitting to a polygraph ex-
amination. The motion was properly denied on the merits. Bruno 
had objected to the motion, but had stated that he would consent 
to the granting of the motion if Dorothy would submit to a 
polygraph examination. The court ruled that it would grant the 
motion if Dorothy consented to the terms suggested by Bruno; 
10 
i il l i e r w l s e , i t would deny t h e m o t i o n on I.he m e r i t s . T h i s r u l i n g 
was lurippi 11 ir| ill 11 I iiiiif ipvidpncp | ml i m' IMI I I 11 r 
ARGUMENT 
POP 
FINDING OF FACT NO. o WAS SUPPORTED 
BY THE EVIDENCE, AND ANY ERROR 
WAS HARMLESS, 
A. ISufastantled E v i d e n c e ibuppor t e d The T r i a l Cour b"' s 
F i n d i n g T h a t The P a r t i e s Did Not I n t e n d The 1973 P r o p e r t y 
S e t t l e m e n t Agreement To Be Band ing Among T h e m s e l v e s . 
Il in I'Vi I. n Il'nile r e s i d i n g IIMI C a l i f o r n i a , I line p a r t i e s e x e c u t e d 
an Agreement wh Lch p J I p o r t e d t o s e p a r a t e 1™ he;.1 i i pr oper t:::.] , B r u n e i 
t e s t i f i e d that" t* line" aqreement .1.'1 ;i p r e p a r e d t s h e ] t ie r t hi-1 IIII I 
v a l u a b l e a s s e t s u l t h e p a r t i e s t rom any c l a i m s which may r e s u l t 
I: in IIIIIII I: 'i in I III« "I-u i t s which were threatening. Bruno communieated 
t h i n i T i lh ir"11 i 11 In ,n I m l "J i t icpiftfl I I I Aqrer>tnf>h* " m» ' 
his representation, Although Dorothy bo I J an entirely conf 1 J.L t-
uig storyf the trial court was entitled to find the facts as 
t e s t i f i e i I I Il iiv hi"IIIIIII 
"II1"!in" parties agree that n post-nuptial agreement I s to be 
treated the same as any other contract See Berman v. Bern a n 
Il i I  II II ? 7 "II 1 ;" 1 1 1 1 i, Il "II 11.j in Il i i • |i , i n R e H a i b e r ( " S b a l e v 
v , H a r b e r l , 10 4 Ar i z • '/ 9
 (l 4 4 9 P . 2 d 7 1 ft ( 19 6 9 ) . 
A contract Is not: formed, notwithstanding the vritten is 
on t-hp page, :i f parties do not inl end it 
Klimek v, Peris ich, 2 3 I <: i. , 7 JI, 1 1 P. 2d 9 58, ,1962). 
Accord Southland Corp. v. Potter, 760 P.2d 320, 322 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988); Berkeley Bank for Cooperatives v. Meibos, 607 P.2d 
798, 803 (Utah 1980) • 
The testimony of Bruno, viewed as required in the light 
most favorable to the judgment below, supports the finding that 
the parties did not intend to be bound, as between themselves, 
by the 1973 agreement. This finding is further buttressed by 
the fact that, although the parties exchanged certain deeds to 
make the public records conform with the written agreement, the 
parties, as between themselves, continued to treat their 
property as they did prior to the execution of the agreement. 
The finding of the trial court that the parties did not intend 
the 1973 agreement to be binding among themselves is amply 
supported by the evidence. 
B. The Trial Court's Division Of The Parties1 Properties 
Was Fair And Equitable Under All The Circumstances. 
The trial court properly found that the 1973 agreement was 
not binding. Even if this court determines that the trial court 
erred in so finding, the error was harmless. Although it is her 
burden on appeal to do so, defendant has not attempted to show 
that the error was not harmless and that the result would have 
been different if the trial court had considered the 1973 agree-
ment to be valid. See Workman v. Workman, 652 P.2d 931, 933 
(Utah 1982). Defendant apparently assumes, without citation of 
authority, that if the trial court were to have determined that 
certain properties were Dorothyfs "separate" properties, such 
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"separate" properties would have beei 1 rimtomaticalXy awarded to 
her. Sucli a proposition Is not supported by Tit ah i 
The I ii concerning pi: emar i ta3 proptrt ,'' Ihii i i I>M t ecenl, 1 y 
stated by the Utah Supreme Cour t as folloMii 
Prema r 11; HI 1, property, gifts, a 11 I n.nhe r i -
I may IWJ v i ewed as separate property 
and in appropriate circumstances, equity 
will require that each party retain the 
separate property brought to the marriage. 
However, the rule is not invariable. In 
fashioning an equitable property division, 
trial courts need consider all of the 
pertinent circumstances. 
Burke v. Burke, 73 i H.M III, I l"» illlrih Mil.1! hihatinr^ 
" " i l l 1.1 M I | „ p e e d l b o N a r a m u v . N a r d i l i iu, '"ill III1 "ill | | | | IIIIIIIIII illi Il 
App. 1988) ,' Peterson v. Peterson, 748 V . 2ci ' i' i l mi 111 -ih ( ti, A1.111, 
1985) . 
Il ill a d d i t i o n i il r / o n v e cuiti I: i s mil III.JIIJM.1 LI, I I»I lleiiiuiiL 
ag reemen t n c e r n i n g A d i v i s i o n of i irojjKTty. K l e i n v. Kle j n 
544 I' ?i1 1 '' ' -1 h (l l iaii 19 lb) 
Appl icat 11 HI ill I'hese principles is illustrated in '^ ° 
recent case of Noble v. Noble, 761 P,2d 13 Hit .ih 1988). 
The parties had been married only appr oxima tely four year s. The 
lThe distinction :i i I this case is actually betweei i ' s sp a :i :: 
ate" and community (or marital) property, rather than "pre-
marital11 and marital property. The law dealing with premarital 
property, should, however, be equally applicable to separate 
property. 
The tin .ill court in this case found that essentially all of 
""• parties i inn rent assets were marital property. i(F, 4'""i6 para, 
) 
13 
trial court awarded the wife a substantial amount of alimony, 
and in addition, awarded her approximately one-third of the 
husband's premarital assets. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed 
the award, holding that it was appropriate in view of the wife's 
need for support, the husband's relative wealth, and the wife's 
relative poverty. Id. at 1373. 
Application of these principles to the instant case compels 
the conclusion that the trial court's property division was fair 
and equitable. The 1973 agreement did not purport to suggest 
how property should be divided in the event of a divorce, but 
only purported to affect how the legal title would be held. 
There was no evidence that the parties intended or contemplated 
that each party should retain his or her "separate" property in 
the event of a divorce. The evidence supported the court's 
finding that the only intent of the parties was to shelter their 
primary assets from potential creditors of the husband, and that 
the parties did not intend the agreement to be binding among 
themselves. 
Even if the agreement was binding, at the time of trial, 
Bruno's only income was a social security allowance of $438.00 
per month. Bruno had no other significant assets. Dorothy, by 
contrast, testified that she had in her possession over 
$375,000.00 in cash, together with extensive and valuable 
additional assets. 
Nowhere in her brief does Dorothy assert that the property 
division was not fair and equitable. Her only argument is that 
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it contravened the terms of the 1973 agreement * review of all 
the evidence shows tl..\" fhe trial court's property division was 
l i a . L i " I in n II p i ] mi in in I i l l 11 M i l l Il mi II 'ill in H I I ! II II ii"!."! el f J: i ? 'inn e i i 
PC II I I II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN DENYING DEFENDANT AN AWARD OF ALIMONY, 
AND THE EVIDENCE AND THE RECORD SUPPORT 
FINDING NOS 16 AND 21 
Defendant a s s e r t s t h a t F i n d i n g s nl" I n t" l lns . 16 and 21 a r e 
not- Rnrvor.. . , e n c e - a1 «* r.mn-
pleVt - i - v i : ; e r : re showinc " o n s : 
i i d u e u n e u t a h * 
^ p p e a ^ / w . a i . n g t o ^ v awara^ u i _ a i . 
: s s t a t e m e n t i s 
making an awara ,^
 a a..wii> A.a. ,. . -ws: 
spousal support and, if so, in what amount, 
the trial court must consider the financial 
condition and needs of the spouse claiming 
support, the ability of that, spouse to 
provide sufficient income for him or 
herself, and the ability of the responding 
spouse to provide the support. 
P a f f e l v, JPaffel, 73 2 P , ?d *fi , 1 n 1 (Utah I (i m 
The F i n d i n u u ul I tv\ 11II i ill 11 Ii duLenddiit c o m p l a i n s , lunlina 
1T I ! h> »J I in I •' I ! c l e a r l y d e m o n s t r a t e tliiil I In I rial court 
I'nnn idinred t h e s e factor' I niilimi fhi llii ii.nl lis fullnw 
The plaintiff's income at the present time 
is social security in the sum of $438.00 per 
month. The defendant, Dorothy D1Aston, has 
no monthly earned or retirement income. 
Finding No. 21 reads as follows: 
The Court makes no award of alimony for 
either party as there should be sufficient 
assets on which to live. The defendant, 
Dorothy D1Aston, should be able to draw 
social security at age 62. 
The trial court clearly considered "the financial condition 
and needs of the spouse claiming support [and] the ability of 
that spouse to provide sufficient income for him or herself.ff 
The court found that Dorothy had no income, but that she had 
been awarded sufficient assets to provide for her support. The 
court also considered "the ability of the responding spouse to 
provide the support." The court specifically found that Bruno 
had no income, except for his social security allowance. 
It appears that Dorothy's real argument is not that the 
trial court failed to consider the appropriate factors, but 
rather that the trial court made the "wrong" decision. Dorothy 
sets forth extensive quotations from the record showing that 
Bruno had historically enjoyed a much greater income. (Brief of 
the Appellant at 20-22.) The test is not, of course, whether 
there was evidence from which the court could have found in 
favor of Dorothy. The evidence in this case was certainly 
conflicting. The trial court resolved the conflicts in favor of 
Bruno. There is adequate support in the record for the trial 
court's findings. 
Bruno has no earned income but was forced to go on social 
security from which source he receives $438.00 per month (R. 758 
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11-111 Bruno, wlio wa^ born on August 30 iQ*n, is now 65 years 
of aqp (See Passport, Exhibit c 6^) , 
11 I I n m i mi III in I  in i 11! l i , In n I in i i 2 n.1 id in i n i mil i IIIIII ' \ | n i I  i mi I in ' i 
I , l i e d a y s h e m a d B r u n o r e m i f i o n i 1 h e P r o v n I n i t i o , M h o h a d a l 
l e a s t thr» i n t e r e s t on I III in M I IMI I I IIIIIII in ill o i n I III n IIIIII nf 
, in, ini i i p^r m o n t n will 11 in nnii i i in.Mi i i n[ umuei MI I M 
which t i m e l u n m t h y , IIIIII v i o l a t i o n cil 1 he c o u r t ' s o r d e r ill 
niiniliHii tiif III ill i I nr r a s h ini n e p t e m b e r 10 il i Mio purcha- MM 
in i i i h i e i ' b c h e c k l i om t h e III1 uml1 nl IIIIII HI in i lm lhi> imIII  MI 
$63 3 , 000 , mo (Exh ib I t 14 4) , She t h e n a p p a r e n t l y e l e c t e d t o I: eop 
". i II i II II r i in mi I I I I I I I l i mi in >. II I o i l , i l l l p f i o q i II' I n i > in in Ih i in in III in in in i III 
$ 7 5 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 r a s h in a s a f e t y d e p o s i t box ol hot homo, she d id 
I ill ^14 ,000 ,0(1 in a s a v i n g s a c c o u n t and ,i Mi, noo . 00 in a c h e c k i n g 
in 'i. 11 in in II II in II 11 II in ohdiji'i! "I in ' I in I in I in II in i in n I III 11 III i III i 1 iiin i IIIIII i II ' I IIIIIII IIIIIII 
in s i l v e r b u l l i o n and t h e n c l a i m s t u have used o v e r $10U,00U.U0 
in L iv ing and o t h e i e x p e n s e s from Sep tember u i liJCW, t o A p r i l of 
I u o 1 II, II II " Il Il II 
The p a r t i e s had in lolif, e x c e p t t h r iimniinf Bruno owed f o r 
Q l e c o n s i g n e d i i,i"f)pert\i Ooro thy was awarded i In imp f r p p and 
o l p a r of any uncumbi ancea ami i LiiiliMMiiMI i ill aim IIIIIII I nl nl In i 
II mi 111 nt y a s s e t f o r t h In t h e D e c r e e , llit> i i n c o n t r o v e r t e d f a c t s 
t h o r n u q h l v 'iiipiiiut I hi- c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g No. Ml t in t" i t makes no 
awaicl ot a l imony toi e i t h e r p a r t y a s t h e r e shuuJiJI In u u l . L n . n n l 
a s s e t s on wh ich t o l i v e . 
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POINT III 
THE CONDUCT OF THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT 
CONSTITUTE JUDICIAL BIAS. 
Dorothy claims, for the first time on appeal, that the 
conduct of the trial court, subsequent to the entry of the 
Decree of Divorce, constituted judicial bias. Dorothy did not, 
however, file a motion to disqualify the judge. Even if 
Dorothy's brief was considered as a request for disqualification 
of the judge, the request is untimely, Birch v. Birch, 106 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 36 (Ct. App. April 10, 1989), and is not supported by 
affidavit as required by Utah R. Civ. P. 63(b). This court 
should not consider Dorothy's claims which are raised for the 
first time on appeal. 
It appears that Dorothy's real contention is that the trial 
court erred in denying her motion to reopen. The record, 
however, supports the trial court's ruling. 
There is no evidence in the record that the Court became 
angry when the polygraph issue was presented. Birch v. Birch, 
106 Utah Adv. Rep. 36, 38 (Ct. App. April 10, 1989) (unrecorded 
comments in chambers cannot be considered by appellate court). 
The record is all to the contrary. The Court thoroughly 
discussed the admissibility of a polygraph test during the 
course of the trial and analyzed the cases and made his ruling. 
(R. 409, 1. 15 through R. 414.) 
Trial of this case was held before the court on April 18 to 
April 21, 1988. At the conclusion of the evidence, the Court 
requested simultaneous written argument and simultaneous 
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responses. Bruno's written argument was submitted to the Court 
on May 9, 1988. (R. 360.) Dorothy submitted her closing 
written argument on May 9, 1988. (R. 377.) Bruno submitted his 
response to Dorothy's closing argument on May 13, 1988. (R. 
383.) 
Dorothy filed her Motion to Reopen Trial on June 20, 1988 
(R. 392), and attached to her Memorandum three Affidavits. (R. 
400, R. 401 and R. 408.) The affidavits were presented only to 
further challenge Bruno's credibility. Bruno responded to 
Dorothy's Motion to Reopen Trial (R. 410) and submitted an 
Affidavit of the plaintiff denying the allegations of the three 
Affidavits submitted by Dorothy. (R. 424.) 
A motion to reopen is addressed to the sound discretion of 
the trial court. Gardner v. Christensen, 622 P.2d 782, 784 
(Utah 1980). Such a motion may properly be denied where the 
evidence could, with the exercise of due diligence, have been 
discovered prior to trial. Johnson v. Johnson, 674 P.2d 539, 
545 (Okl. 1983). The trial court could have properly made such 
a determination in this case. For example, one of the af-
fidavits challenged the authenticity of certain invoices offered 
into evidence by Bruno. (R. 402-04.) Those same invoices, 
however, had been attached to Dorothy's requests for admissions 
to Bruno (R. 44-48) , and Bruno had clearly indicated that he 
considered the invoices to be authentic. (R. 68-70). Further-
more, the evidence proferred was only cummulative evidence of 
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credibility. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying the motion on the merits. 
Dorothy complains, however, that the trial court somehow 
indicated bias by stating that it would grant the motion if 
Dorothy would consent to a polygraph examination. The trial 
court imposed that condition only because Bruno had indicated he 
would withdraw his objection to the motion if that condition 
were accepted. 
In part of the Bruno's response to the Motion to Reopen 
Trial, Bruno's position was as follows: 
Plaintiff would not resist a motion to 
reopen trial if a condition to the granting 
of the motion is that all parties, including 
the plaintiff, Bruno D'Aston, the defendant, 
Dorothy D'Aston, and the defendant, Eric 
Aston, submit to a polygraph test and that 
any other witnesses to be called including 
Barbara Goldfried and Michael A. Graham also 
submit to a polygraph test and that the 
results be admitted into evidence. 
(R. 410.) 
The court considered Dorothy's motion and made its Minute 
Entry (R. 435) wherein the Minute Entry stated: 
Counsel met with the Court in chambers 
regarding defendant's motion to reopen this 
case which was submitted by the defendants. 
The Court will consent to said motion 
provided that the parties and witnesses who 
have submitted affidavits in this matter 
will consent to taking a polygraph test. 
The affidavits submitted to the Court in the 
post-trial memorandum are contested by the 
plaintiff. Plaintiff is to pay the cost for 
the polygraph tests. Mr. Harrison is to 
contact the defendants immediately to see 
whether or not the defendants will take the 
lie detector test, if not, the Court will 
deny the defendant's motion to reopen. The 
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same polygraph operator is to administer all 
tests. 
There is no evidence in the record or otherwise to support 
Dorothy's position that any conduct of the trial court con-
stitutes judicial bias. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence in this case was hotly contested. The trial 
court, after viewing the demeanor of the witnesses over a four-
day trial, found the issues predominantly in favor of Bruno 
D'Aston. The trial court's findings are supported by competent 
evidence. The trial court's division of property was fair and 
equitable and within the trial court's discretion. The decision 
of the trial court should be affirmed in all respects. 
DATED this 26th day of May, 1989. 
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